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WHAT'S THAT MEAN? A PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
METHODOLOGY FOR PHILLIPS V. A WH CORP.
JESSICA C. KAISER*
Man does not live by words alone, in spite of the fact that sometimes he
has to eat them.1
INTRODUCTION
Language by its very nature is ambiguous. The mathematician can
start from first principles and use a series of equations to determine a final
result. This result is either a number or an expression in terms of variables.
Either way, the mathematician's result is clear and satisfying. The lawyer,
however, works with words, 2 and words leave themselves open for argu-
ment about their meaning. Indeed, a lawyer makes a living arguing about
the meaning of words in prior court decisions, about the meaning of words
in statutes, and in the case of patent law, about the meaning of words in
patent claims.
In patent litigation, judges must determine the proper meaning of
terms in patent claims in a process called claim construction. Although
judges are typically lay people or "generalists," judges must determine the
meaning of patent claim terms from the standpoint of one of ordinary skill
in the art.3 Therefore, in the case of a patent on a particular circuit design,
the judge must determine what the term would mean to an electrical engi-
neer who is the audience of the patent and not what the generalist judge
would have thought the term meant.
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2005; B.S. Metallurgical and Materials Engi-
neering, Colorado School of Mines, 1996. The author would like to thank Dean Harold Krent, Professor
Kristen Osenga, and the 2005 Honors Scholars Class for their valuable comments and insights on this
Note. Additionally, the author would like to thank countless other professors on the outstanding faculty
at Chicago-Kent for their mentorship and encouragement.
1. THE WIT AND WISDOM OF ADLAI STEVENSON 69 (Edward Hanna et al. ed., 1965).
2. By one estimate, there are four million words in the English lexicon. SIDNEY 1. LANDAU,
DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 17 (1989) [hereinafter LANDAU,
DICTIONARIES]. These include 700,000 words in the Merriam-Webster files and at least one million
scientific words, as well as coined words, dialectal words, slang, new words, exotic words, and words
derived from place names. Id.
3. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The
words used in the claims are examined through the viewing glass of a person skilled in the art.").
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In the Federal Circuit, the specialized court of appeals that reviews is-
sues of patent law, an intracircuit split has developed over the proper meth-
odology to use in claim construction. 4 The Federal Circuit recently granted
en banc review in Phillips v. A WH Corp.5 to resolve this intracircuit split
and determine the appropriate methodology for claim construction. One
methodology, first developed in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix,
Inc.,6 creates a bright-line rule that first looks to dictionaries to provide the
ordinary meaning of terms contained in patent claims. This note argues that
the Federal Circuit should not adopt this methodology in its en bane Phil-
lips decision because dictionaries are not a good proxy for what one of
ordinary skill in the art would have thought that a claim term meant. In-
stead, this Note recommends an approach that would give the court a
greater chance of construing the term in accordance with what one of ordi-
nary skill thought the term meant and that better promotes the policy goals
of patent law.
Part I of this Note provides background on patent claim construction
and patent law policies. Part II describes three different approaches that
panels in the Federal Circuit have used to construe claim terms: the intrin-
sic/extrinsic dichotomy, the holistic approach, and the dictionary first ap-
proach. This part also provides the relevant questions that the Federal
Circuit has set out to decide en bane in Phillips v. A WH Corp. These ques-
tions include ones designed to determine the proper methodology for claim
construction. Part IlI argues that the Federal Circuit should not adopt the
Texas Digital "dictionary first" approach. This part first provides back-
ground information on dictionaries and then discusses which dictionaries
the Federal Circuit has used in conducting its de novo review of claim con-
struction. Finally, this part discusses the problems with adopting the "dic-
tionary first" approach. Part IV briefly discusses the reasons for rejecting
the holistic approach, which is characterized as having no set methodology.
Part V proposes a modified intrinsic/extrinsic approach, which effectuates
the policy of public notice by encouraging patentees to remove ambiguity
from their patent documents.
4. See infra Part 11.
5. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
6. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Claim Construction
In a patent application, the patent applicant must include "one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."'7 Claims define the bounda-
ries of the patentee's right to exclude others from practicing the invention.8
Issues of patent claim construction arise during patent infringement
litigation.9 A patentee will file suit for patent infringement (or an alleged
infringer will file a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement) when
the alleged infringer makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell something that
either literally or equivalently meets all the elements of a claim in the pat-
ent.10 The court then engages in a two-step process to determine if patent
infringement has occurred: (1) the court first construes the patent claims at
issue, and (2) the court then determines whether the accused device in-
fringes the claim as properly construed.11
In "claim construction," the court determines the proper meaning of
words in patent claims. 12 Typically, in a patent infringement suit, parties
will dispute the construction of only a few terms and will agree on the
proper construction of the other terms. Claim construction is a question of
law to be decided by the judge, and therefore, the judge, not a jury, decides
the appropriate construction of terms in patent claims. 13 The judge must
construe the claims from the view of "one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of invention." 14
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2000).
8. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), affd,
517 U,S. 370 (1996).
9. Issues of claim construction also can arise in a validity analysis. For simplicity, claim con-
struction in this Note will be discussed from the context of an infringement case. The analysis would
not differ greatly, if at all, in determining validity.
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
11. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996). This Note is
concerned with the claim construction step and does not look at the process of determining actual
infringement.
12. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(The court's role in claim construction is "ascertaining the meaning of the claim terms.").
13. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1582.
14. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1361; see also Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334
F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The words used in the claims are examined through the viewing
glass of a person skilled in the art.").
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B. Patent Law Policies Relevant to Claim Construction
In determining the appropriate construction of terms in a patent claim,
courts consider several policies relevant to patent law. Federal patent law
derives its authority from Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution, which
states that Congress can "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 5 "The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoid-
ance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant ad-
vance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 16
In exchange for the exclusive patent rights, the patentee must disclose
his invention to the public. 17 The patentee's disclosure "bring[s] new de-
signs and technologies into the public domain."' 8 Disclosure is important in
an effective patent system because there are certain instances where copy-
ing of an invention is desirable, particularly "imitation by refinement" or
"designing around."19
In claim construction, the patentee's obligation of disclosure in the
bargain for patent rights is achieved only if the patent document provides
"public notice" of what is covered by the patent. Competitors are entitled to
rely on the public record of the patent document to determine when their
conduct infringes and when their conduct legitimately "design[s] around
the claimed invention. '20
In claim construction, courts also consider the policy that patent law is
designed to encourage innovation. 21 This policy may be best served by
giving the patentee broad coverage for his invention. A patentee may be
more likely to invest in innovating, because the broader the coverage of the
patent, the more valuable the patent will be. On the other hand, this policy
also can be served by providing certainty of claim scope coverage. If com-
petitors are certain of the scope of an existing patent, then those competi-
15. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S 141, 146 (1989)-
17. Id. at 150-51 ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for en-
couraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and
design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.").
18. Id. at 151.
19. Id. at 146 ("From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
20. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(discussing competitors' right to rely on statements made in the prosecution history of the patent);
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
21. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
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tors will invest in designing around the patented invention.22 Additionally,
competitors would be more likely to engage in secondary innovation, build-
ing off the original invention (and disclosure) by the patentee. This cer-
tainty therefore encourages competitors to innovate.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The Federal Circuit has not used a consistent methodology for claim
construction. Despite the Federal Circuit's penchant for bright-line rules
and certainty, the claim construction result in any case may be highly de-
pendent on the panel drawn for that case.2 3 This Note discusses three meth-
odologies employed by Federal Circuit panels for claim construction: (1)
the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, (2) the holistic approach, and (3) the dic-
tionary first approach.
A. The Intrinsic/Extrinsic Dichotomy
In Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,24 the court stated that, in per-
forming claim construction, the court must look at the intrinsic evidence
before considering any extrinsic evidence. 25 Intrinsic evidence includes: (1)
the language of the claims, (2) the specification, and (3) the prosecution
history. 26 For the language of the claims, the words are generally given
"their ordinary and customary meaning." 27 Additionally, the patentee can
be her own lexicographer as long as the patentee's definition is given in
either the specification or the prosecution history.28 The court should al-
ways review the specification to see if the patentee used terms "in a manner
22. Cf Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Having
prosecution history estoppel as a purely legal issue is consistent with fostering certainty as to a patent's
scope, a consideration that is important for reliance by those in the marketplace.").
23. Indeed, Professor R. Polk Wagner has developed a website, www.claimconstruction.com, that
includes a predictor tool. The predictor tool allows the user to input the three judges on the Federal
Circuit panel, and the tool returns the type of methodology anticipated along with a percentage prob-
ability. Professor Wagner terms his methodologies the procedural and holistic approaches. For a more
detailed description of these methodologies, see R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal
Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105
(2004).
24. 90 F.3d at 1576. The judges on the Vitronics panel were Judges Michel, Lourie, and Friedman.
Id. at 1578.
25. Id. at 1582.
26. ld.
27. Id.
28. ld. ("[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other
than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in the patent
specification or file history.").
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inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. '29 Finally, the prosecution his-
tory is relevant intrinsic evidence because it includes representations made
by the patentee to the patent office. 30
If the intrinsic evidence is clear and unambiguous, then it is improper
for the court to rely on any extrinsic evidence. 31 This approach serves the
policy of public notice, which entitles the public to rely on the public re-
cord associated with the patent. 32
If the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous, then the court will look at ex-
trinsic evidence. 33 Extrinsic evidence can include: (1) expert testimony, (2)
inventor testimony, (3) dictionaries, and (4) technical treatises and arti-
cles. 34 Expert testimony that conflicts with the intrinsic evidence should be
given no weight.35 As to dictionaries, the court did seem to elevate them to
a special place to be used to educate the judge. The court stated:
Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category
of extrinsic evidence, as they do not form a part of the integrated patent
document, they are worthy of special note. Judges are free to consult
such resources at any time in order to better understand the underlying
technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent
documents.36
Further, the court favored prior art use of a term as extrinsic evidence over
expert testimony. 37
B. The Holistic Approach
The holistic approach is primarily characterized by not having a set
methodology. Instead, the court generally hears all the evidence and from
the evidence divines the proper claim construction. For example, in EMI
29. Id.
30. Id. (The prosecution history includes "any express representations made by the applicant
regarding the scope of the claims.").
31. Id. at 1583.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1584.
34. Id. ("Extrinsic evidence is that evidence which is external to the patent and file history, such as
expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.").
35. Id. ("[T]he expert testimony, which was inconsistent with the specification and file history,
should have been accorded no weight.").
36. Id- at 1584 n.6.
37. Id. at 1584. The court favored prior art over expert witness testimony because expert witness
testimony only reflects the view of one expert, whereas prior art references may convey the broader
understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. Id.
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Group North America, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,38 at the Markman hearing,39 the
district court heard extensive testimony from experts about claim construc-
tion.40 The Federal Circuit recognized that it had previously ruled that
"claims should preferably be interpreted without recourse to extrinsic evi-
dence such as expert testimony, other than perhaps dictionaries or reference
books, and that expert testimony should be received only for the purpose of
educating the judge."'4 1 The court said that in its de novo review it consid-
ered the analysis and conclusions of the district court, the record of the
Markman hearing, and the conflicting testimony and opinions of expert
witnesses. 42 The Federal Circuit reviewed all of this and affirmed the dis-
trict court's claim construction. 43
Because the court used the holistic approach, it did not engage in a hi-
erarchical intrinsic/extrinsic analysis but instead weighed all the evidence
introduced and then reached its conclusion.
C. The Dictionary First Approach
A third approach taken by the Federal Circuit is the "dictionary first
approach." The Federal Circuit used this approach in Texas Digital Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.4 4 In this opinion, the Federal Circuit stated that
the focus must be on the language of the claims. 45 There is a "heavy pre-
sumption" that claim terms have the ordinary meaning that "would be at-
tributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art."4 6
Under this approach, dictionaries should be used to show ordinary
meaning.47 The Federal Circuit cited both its own precedent and precedent
from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals-the predecessor court to
the Federal Circuit-to show that "dictionaries, encyclopedias, and trea-
tises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining the
38. 157 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The judges on the EMI panel were Judges Newman, Plager,
and Bryson. Id. at 889.
39. A Markman hearing is generally the hearing where the parties present evidence to the judge on
the issue of claim construction. The name is derived from the case Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), affid, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
40. EMI, 157 F.3d at 892.
41. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane),
aIJd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 895.
44. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The judges on the Texas Digital panel were Judges Linn,
Michel, and Schall. Id. at 1197.
45. Id. at 1201.
46. Id- at 1202.
47. Id.
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ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms." 48 The court further stated
that, "[d]ictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of
determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of skill in
the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor in the claims." 49
Therefore, under the Texas Digital approach, courts are free to consult
dictionaries even when such dictionaries have not been offered into evi-
dence by the parties.
The Texas Digital panel stated that this approach best served the pol-
icy of providing public notice.50 The court found that reference to not only
the intrinsic record of the patent but also dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
treatises serves the policy of providing notice of the scope of the claims to
the public. 5 1 These references are "publicly available at the time the patent
is issued, [and] are objective resources that serve as reliable sources of
information on the established meanings that would have been attributed to
the terms of the claims by those of skill in the art."'52 Further, these refer-
ences are "unbiased reflections of common understanding not influenced
by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic re-
cord by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties,
and not inspired by litigation." 53 The court therefore elevated dictionaries,
treatises, and encyclopedias to a place above other forms of extrinsic evi-
dence as the "most meaningful" to educate the judge in understanding the
technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art.54 The court
stated that courts are free, not only to consult any dictionaries they choose
sua sponte, but also to consult dictionaries "at any stage of the litigation. 55
The court also said that these materials should not be categorized as either
"extrinsic evidence" or a "special form of extrinsic evidence." 56
The court then stated that the intrinsic record could be used to deter-
mine which dictionary definitions are appropriate in the event that multiple
definitions exist. 57 If multiple definitions are consistent, then the court
48. Id. (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Optical Disc Corp. v. Dcl Mar
Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577,
1581 (Fed. Cit. 1995); In re Ripper, 171 F.2d 297, 299 (C.C.P.A. 1948)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1202-03.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1203.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. ("Because words often have multiple dictionary definitions, some having no relation to the
claimed invention, the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different
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should construe the term to encompass all consistent definitions.5 8 To de-
termine if a definition is consistent, the court looks to see if "the inventor
has disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using words or expres-
sion of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of
claim scope."
'59
The Federal Circuit expressly stated that it was inappropriate to re-
view the written description or the prosecution history, part of the intrinsic
evidence, before the court has determined the ordinary and customary
meaning. 60 The Federal Circuit worried that relying only on the intrinsic
record in the first instance would lead to courts improperly limiting the
claim to the preferred embodiment.6 1
D. Phillips en banc
Faced with this intracircuit split, in July 2004, the Federal Circuit
granted en banc review in Phillips v. AHW Corp.62 to decide in part:
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referenc-
ing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar
sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's
use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be consulted,
in what order?
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpreta-
tion, should the specification limit the full scope of claim language (as
defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own
lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of
claim scope? If so, what language in the specification will satisfy those
conditions? What use should be made of general as opposed to technical
dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there
are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the dictionary
provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it ap-
propriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or
definitions should apply?
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specifica-
tion, what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the
ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the inven-
tion disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single em-
possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by
the inventor.").
58. Id. at 1203.
59. Id. at 1204.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1204-05.
62. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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bodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are
disclosed? 63
This en banc case and particularly these questions have brought the is-
sue of the appropriate claim construction methodology to the forefront.
This is a hotly contested issue; indeed, over thirty organizations and inter-
ested parties have filed amicus briefs in the Phillips case.64 The Federal
Circuit has the opportunity to determine a consistent methodology for
claim construction. This Note argues that the Federal Circuit should not
adopt the "dictionary first" approach used by the court in Texas Digital, but
that the court should instead adopt a methodology that better serves policy
goals of patent law.
II1. JUNK LEXICOLOGY: THE DICTIONARY FIRST APPROACH
In its en banc decision in Phillips, the Federal Circuit should not adopt
the "dictionary first" approach used in Texas Digital. For the reasons dis-
cussed below, although dictionaries should be considered as extrinsic evi-
dence, which a court can rely on to educate itself, dictionaries should not be
consulted in the first instance, and patentees should not be required to rebut
dictionary definitions if the ordinary meaning is clear from the intrinsic
evidence and the knowledge of those skilled in the art.
This part begins with a discussion of dictionaries generally and the
dictionaries on which the Federal Circuit has relied. This part then argues
that the nature of dictionaries and the Federal Circuit's use of them show
that the Federal Circuit should not adopt the "dictionary first" approach in
its en banc Phillips decision.
A. Background on Dictionaries
1. Dictionaries Generally
To understand the "dictionary first" approach, it is important first to
understand precisely what dictionaries are. Generally, "[a] dictionary is a
book that lists words in alphabetical order and describes their meanings.
Modem dictionaries often include information about spelling, syllabication,
pronunciation, etymology (word derivation), usage, synonyms, and gram-
mar, and sometimes illustrations as well." 65 Dictionaries are divided into
63. Id. at 1383.
64. For a complete list of amicus briefs filed in the Phillips case, see
http://www.faegre.comcustom/page_2185.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
65. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES, supra note 2, at 5.
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types depending on their coverage and type of use. The broadest type of
dictionary is the unabridged, general use dictionary. An unabridged dic-
tionary "gives full coverage to the lexicon in general use at a particular
time in the history of a language," and general use refers to the "common
use in the public press and in ordinary speech... as distinguished from
specialized lexicons such as those of law, medicine, or the physical sci-
ences."'66 Further, dictionaries capture the language at a specific point in
time, and most dictionaries are meant to be contemporaneous. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary and college dictionaries are generally
concerned with the present time, but sometimes lag because "it takes years
to produce any dictionary and even synchronic works include some archaic
forms."
6 7
Dictionaries are relevant precisely because they contain definitions.
Definitions of general terms in modem general usage dictionaries are de-
veloped through "citation files." "A citation file is a collection of potential
lexical units in the context of actual usage, drawn from a great variety of
written sources and often some spoken sources, chiefly because the context
illuminates an aspect of the meaning. '68 Citations can provide illustrative
quotations, preferred spellings, context, and pronunciation of the word.69
The Oxford English Dictionary was prepared solely on the basis of cita-
tions and took fifty years to complete. 70 Webster's Third New International
Dictionary also was developed using citation files. 7 1 Today, definitions are
determined on the basis of citations for new words, but also refer to earlier
versions, other dictionaries, and specialists' opinions for technical and sci-
entific terms. 72
66. Id. at 18. Unabridged English dictionaries generally have from 400,000 to 600,000 words. Id.
Other types of dictionaries include semi-unabridged dictionaries, such as the Random House Diction-
ary, which includes 260,000 words; college dictionaries, which include from 150,000 to 170,000 words;
desk dictionaries, which include from 60,000 to 100,000 words; and pocket dictionaries, which include
from 40,000 to 60,000 words. Id. at 18-19.
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id. at 151.
69. ld
70. id. at 152. Indeed, this practice of basing definitions at least in part on actual usage dates back
to Samuel Johnson's 1755 A Dictionary of the English Language. RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES
AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION 22-23 (1973).
71. HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER'S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE'S CONTROVERSIAL
DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 4 (1994). The editor Philip Gove was criticized for making Webster's
Third descriptive (reflecting actual usage) rather than prescriptive (stating how words ought to be used).
Id. at 7. For an interesting recount of this criticism, see WELLS, supra note 70, at 74-86.
72. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES, supra note 2, at 152. Even terms with extensive citation files can be
flawed. Kemp Malone assembled a much larger sampling than usual for comprehensive dictionaries for
the term "mahogany" and discovered that the term in actual usage had a much different definition than
the primarily scientific definition contained in Webster's Second New International Dictionary. Accord-
1019
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Although actual usage as developed in citation files is used to deter-
mine the meaning of general words, such is typically not the case for scien-
tific terms. Scientific and technical terms in general dictionaries tend to be
derived from expert advice "whose concern is maintaining the internal
coherence of their discipline rather than faithfully recording how terms are
used."' 73 Sidney Landau, a prominent commentator on dictionaries, esti-
mates that forty percent of the entries in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, considered by Landau to be the only unabridged English dic-
tionary, are scientific and technical terms.74 Therefore, although definitions
of general terms are developed using actual usage, scientific terms are de-
fined by "experts" who may take a normative approach to defining terms
rather than providing a definition that reflects the actual usage of the term.
2. The Federal Circuit's Use of Dictionaries
Joseph Miller and James Hilsenteger conducted an empirical study
("the Miller Study") to review the use of dictionaries in patent claim con-
struction. 75 This study found that "[f]rom April 5, 1995 to June 30, 2004,
the Federal Circuit used one or more dictionaries to help construe a dis-
puted claim term 209 times."76 Usage increased from a low of nine times in
1998 to a high of forty-two times in 2003. 77 The Miller Study also found
that the Federal Circuit typically relied on only one source, and that the
sources relied on were usually general purpose, not specialized, sources. 78
Among all sources cited, the Federal Circuit most often cited the
Webster's Third New International Dictionary. That dictionary garnered
ing to Malone, most citations referred to mahogany according to its color and properties as opposed to
the specific tree from which the wood came. Id. at 163-64.
73. Sidney I. Landau, Of Matters Lexicographical: Scientific and Technical Entries in American
Dictionaries, 49 AM. SPEECH 241, 242 (1974) [hereinafter Landau, Of Matters Lexicographical].
74. LANDAU, DICIONARIES, supra note 2, at 21. Landau commented:
The inclusion of specialized scientific terms in such large numbers in our dictionaries dimin-
ishes the force of the claim that dictionaries are based on actual usage .... It also introduces,
even in the most determinedly descriptive work, a normative element, since such definitions
often have a prescriptive purpose. The overall descriptive nature of the dictionary is thus very
substantially blurred.
Id.; see also Landau, Of Matters Lexicographical, supra note 73, at 242.
75. Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries
in the Patent Office & The Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2005).
76. Id. (manuscript at 25). An occurrence of a disputed claim was tabulated on the basis of the
individual term, such that if a case had three disputed terms and the court referred to a dictionary three
times, then the 209 total would include three from a single case. Id. (manuscript at 24).
77. Id. (manuscript at 25 tbl. 4). For the first half of 2004, the Federal Circuit used dictionaries to
construe disputed claim terms thirty-four times. Id.
78. Id. (manuscript at 26) (stating that the Federal Circuit relied on one source 79.9% of the times
it relied on dictionaries and that in 70.5% of the instances it relied on "general purpose English lan-
guage sources").
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"25.4% of all citations to any source (general or specialized), and 36.0% of
all citations to a.general purpose English language source. '79 The Federal
Circuit cited Webster's Third New International Dictionary more often than
the next five dictionaries cited combined. 80 Additionally, Merriam-Webster
dictionaries, which include all editions of the Webster's New International
Dictionary and editions of the New Collegiate Dictionary, represent over a
third of all citations and over a half of general purpose citations. 81
The Federal Circuit cited most specialized sources only once. Special-
ized sources that the Federal Circuit cited more than once generally pertain
to medicine, computing, and electronics.8 2
B. An Illusion: The Failings of the Dictionary First Approach
The Texas Digital approach is flawed because Judge Linn incorrectly
assumes that dictionaries are "reliable sources of information on the estab-
lished meanings that would have been attributed to the terms of the claims
by those of skill in the art." 83 The Federal Circuit should not adopt the "dic-
tionary first" approach because (1) dictionaries are not a reliable proxy for
the view of one skilled in the art; (2) the "dictionary first" approach allows
the courts to arbitrarily choose among dictionaries; (3) the "dictionary first"
approach allows a court to engage in a dictionary fishing expedition until
the court finds the definition it wants to adopt; (4) the "dictionary first"
approach ignores the context of the term within the claim and within the
specification; and (5) dictionaries are not updated often enough to reflect
relatively recent changes in technical language.
1. Dictionaries are not a reliable proxy for the
view of one skilled in the art.
The "dictionary first" approach assumes that dictionaries accurately
and objectively reflect how one skilled in the art would have interpreted the
79. Id. (emphasis in original). Of the 209 citations to dictionaries, the Federal Circuit cited the
different printings of the Webster's Third New International Dictionary sixty-eight times. id.
80. Id. (manuscript at 26 n.94). The Federal Circuit cited Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
tionary eighteen times; Webster's New World Dictionary fifteen times; American Heritage Dictionary
twelve times; Webster's I New Riverside University Dictionary ten times; and McGraw-Hill Diction-
ary of Scientific and Technical Terms, the only specialized source to make the top six, nine times. Id.
81. ld (manuscipt at 26-27).
82. Id. (manuscript at app. B, tbl. 6).
83. Texas Digital Sys. Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc-, 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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term.84 Because this assumption is flawed, the Federal Circuit should reject
this approach.
First, although modem dictionary definitions are generally descriptive,
reflecting how the terms are actually used, dictionary definitions of techni-
cal terms are more likely to be prescriptive, reflecting how scholars believe
the terms should be used. 85 This distinction is particularly relevant in claim
construction because any normative effect intended by the dictionary au-
thor may skew the definition away from the actual usage of the term. In-
stead, the definition of a technical term may not reflect how one of ordinary
skill in the art read the term, but rather how an expert thought they should
read the term. Because this is not the standard by which courts interpret
claims, relying on prescriptive definitions could lead to incorrect claim
construction.
Some technical dictionaries, such as the dictionary published by the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE Dictionary"), 86 are
published by standards-setting organizations. The IEEE dictionary defines
terms in the context of the IEEE standards.8 7 Although these definitions are
heavily reviewed by experts in the field,88 the definitions nevertheless re-
flect the context of the IEEE standards and are not necessarily universal
definitions that encompass all meanings that would be ascribed to the terms
by one of ordinary skill in the art. 89
84. Id. (Dictionaries are "unbiased reflections of common understanding not influenced by expert
testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not col-
ored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.").
85. See Landau, Of Matters Lexicographical, supra note 73, at 242.
86. IEEE 100: THE AUTHORITATIVE DICTIONARY OF IEEE STANDARDS TERMS (7th ed. 2000).
The Federal Circuit has recognized that not everything written by a standards-setting organization rises
to the level of a dictionary. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1089 90 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Linn, Friedman, & Plager, JJ.). The Federal Circuit chose not to rely on certain documents published as
working papers by the World Wide Web Consortium because the purpose of the papers was to "collect
commentary and to select language to facilitate a common understanding, or to select a standard, from a
variety of competing technologies and vocabularies and from a variety of potentially competing inter-
ests." Id. at 1089. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit declined to adopt a bright-line rule that would
exclude all documents from standards-setting organizations, as those that could "aid in determining the
ordinary and customary meaning of technical terms," if the document actually reflects the usage of
those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 1090.
87. See IlEE, Frequently Asked Questions: IEEE Dictionary, at
http://standards.ieee.org/faqs/StdlOO.html#Ql (last visited Apr. 4, 2005) ("IEEE 100 compiles terms
and definitions from over 800 IEEE standards."). Additionally, IEEE has not added any terms to its
dictionary that are not in its standards. Id- ("[S]ince 1992, only terms from approved IEEE standards are
being added.").
88. "This means that the terms and definitions have been created by actual working groups that
are developing standards in particular areas. As such, the terms and definitions undergo extensive peer
review, coordination with other related fields, and-consensus broad-based balloting before they are
accepted into practice as standard terminology." Id.
89. Tiersma notes that "[p]recise language is possible only when there is a unified speech commu-
nity that consistently uses a term in the same way." PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 109 (1999)
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Further, relying first on dictionary definitions, particularly those in
general purpose dictionaries, isolates the interpretation of the term from the
experiences of the reader. Instead of taking into account the scope of
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art (including education, special-
ized training, and specialized experience that such a person would possess),
the dictionary first approach removes the term from the context of this
overall experience. Some documents, such as some statutes, are autono-
mous documents, not dependent on outside information to convey meaning,
and these documents may stand on their own to provide meaning to those
reading them.90 Patents, however, are not autonomous. Instead, they rely
heavily on the knowledge of the reader in the art area to supply context.
Dictionaries do not serve as a reliable proxy for one skilled in the art be-
cause dictionaries oversimplify the viewpoint of one skilled in the art and
deprive courts from seeking information to better understand this
viewpoint.
Because dictionaries may not provide descriptive definitions for tech-
nical terms and dictionary definitions do not convey the unique experiences
of those skilled in the art, the Federal Circuit in its Phillips en banc deci-
sion should reject the "dictionary first" approach.
2. Certainty Only on the Surface: The dictionary first approach allows for
arbitrary dictionary selection.
Even if dictionaries did reflect the view of one of ordinary skill in the
art, the Federal Circuit should still reject the "dictionary first" approach
because the approach has failed to realize its main goal of promoting cer-
tainty. The Federal Circuit has failed to develop any clear rules establishing
(discussing varying usage of legal terms among the fifty state jurisdictions). Although dictionaries by
standards-setting organizations may not convey actual usage, these dictionaries do provide a unique
opportunity within a "unified speech community" to develop a coherent, and therefore more precise,
standard for how terms are used. Some commentators believe that patentees should be required to
choose their dictionaries of choice at the time they file their applications. See Miller & Hilsenteger,
supra note 75, at 46. This requirement, however, fails to recognize that dictionaries alone may be
insufficient to convey the meaning of the terms, Also, this requirement pushes the costs of locating
references from the litigation phase to the application phase. Because most patents are not commercial-
ized, let alone litigated, this shift of costs and resources seems unnecessary. See infra Part V.
90. See Paul Kay, Language Evolution and Speech Style, in SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
LANGUAGE CHANGE 21, 21-22 (Ben G. Blount & Mary Sanches eds., 1977). Kay discusses autono-
mous speech where the speech can be viewed only in the context of the words themselves without
regard to other channels such as "paralinguistic, postural, and gestural." Id. Also, Kay says that this type
of speech is only "minimally dependent on the contribution of background information on the part of
the hearer." Id. Kay says that this type of speech is "ideal for technical and abstract communication
among strangers and inappropriate for the communication of immediate and emotionally laden content
between intimates." Id. at 22; see also TIERSMA, supra note 89, at 127-28.
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on which dictionaries it will rely. 91 The Federal Circuit also has not estab-
lished guidelines for when it will use general or specialized sources.9 2 Fur-
ther, if the Federal Circuit chooses to adopt the "dictionary first" method in
its en banc Phillips decision, such guidelines would be difficult to
establish.
The Federal Circuit might consider establishing a bright-line rule that
courts will only consult one general purpose dictionary, such as the preva-
lent Webster's Third New International Dictionary. This rule might seem
attractive at first glance because it would promote certainty in litigation
since litigants would know on which dictionary the court would rely. This
rule also would provide one dictionary as a tool for future patent drafters
and would serve the public notice function by providing a concrete refer-
ence for the public to refer to when reading the patent.
The Federal Circuit, however, should not adopt such a rule because it
would disrupt the settled expectations of current patent holders.93 Owners
of patents now expect that courts will allow their litigation attorneys to
argue the meaning of claim terms as would have been understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art. Even under the "dictionary first" approach, these
arguments include which dictionary contains the proper definition of the
term as used in the patent. If the Federal Circuit adopted a bright-line rule
requiring the use of certain dictionaries, it would prevent attorneys from
making such arguments. Under the "dictionary first" approach, attorneys
would have to rebut a single dictionary, which may not encompass the
ordinary meaning of the term.
In addition, choice of a single dictionary may exclude some relevant
definitions. In Nystroin v. TREX Co., the parties disputed whether the term
"board" included only wood boards or also synthetic boards.94 The Federal
Circuit quoted definitions from both Webster's Third New International
Dictionary and the American Heritage Dictionary.9 5 Webster's included
only the restrictive definition limited to a "sawed piece of lumber," while
the American Heritage Dictionary provided a broader definition that in-
91. See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 75, at 32.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 45. Miller and Hilsenteger also consider this same bright-line rule and reject it because it
"violat[es] existing patentees' settled expectations about the acceptability of numerous dictionaries,
land] .. fail[sl to take any account of the court's preference, about 30% of the time, for specialized
reference sources." Id. Miller and Hilsenteger also conclude, as I do, that a rule allowing the court to
consult multiple sources results in "predictability quickly begin[ning] to collapse." d.
94. 374 F.3d 1105, 1110-Il (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 75, at 42-
43.
95. Mystrom,3741.3datlll -12.
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cluded the phrase "or similarly rigid material. '96 The Federal Circuit
adopted the broader definition, 97 but had the court been limited to one spe-
cific dictionary, it might not have been able to consider the broader defini-
tion at all. 98
Based on these arguments, it seems unlikely that the Federal Circuit
could or should adopt certain references as controlling. Therefore, if the
Federal Circuit adopts the "dictionary first" approach, which has been justi-
fied on the basis on promoting certainty, it seems likely that parties would
continue to engage in a "battle of the dictionaries." Beyond this, different
judges may simply arbitrarily choose on which dictionary to rely.99 If there
is no way for parties to predict on which dictionary the court will rely, then
the "dictionary first" method will continue to fail to achieve its goal of
certainty.
3. Gone Fishing? The dictionary first approach allows courts to fish for
additional definitions.
The Federal Circuit also should reject the "dictionary first" approach
because it allows the court to go on a "dictionary fishing expedition." In
this type of expedition, the court uses dictionaries, not to define the claim
term itself, but to engage in a scavenger hunt of sorts, collecting new defi-
nitions as they arise from the previous definition. 100
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Eon Labs Manufacturing, Inc.10 1
illustrates the danger of such a scavenger hunt. In Novartis, the Federal
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1112.
98. Cf. Hibbs v. Wim, 542 U.S. 88, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2294 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In
Hibbs, the dissent recognized that, had the lower court looked at different general purpose dictionaries
or specialized tax and law dictionaries, it would have found definitions that supported a broader defini-
tion of the term at issue in the statute. Id. This recognition by four Justices, in the context of statutory
construction, that different dictionaries can contain definitions of varying breadth counsels against
adopting a bright-line rule for patent claim construction that would adopt one dictionary while exclud-
ing all others. This would exclude definitions in specialized dictionaries as well as definitions of vary-
ing breadth in different general purpose dictionaries-
99. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 75, at 33 (discussing Judge T.S. Ellis' (E.D. Va.) comment
that "[he] use[s] the dictionary in [his] library") (citing Judge Lourie Defends CAFC Reversals, PTO
ChiefRogan Promises Patent Quality, 66 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 580, 581 (Sept.
26, 2003)). The study also notes that in four cases the Federal Circuit used a different dictionary than
the district court used and that the Federal Circuit did not state a reason for doing so. Id. Certainly, the
Federal Circuit could require in its en banc Phillips decision that its panels rely on the same references
as the district court unless the Federal Circuit provides its reasons for relying on different references.
100. This phenomenon also was recognized in the Miller study, which found six precedential
Federal Circuit cases where the court "used a dictionary to define a wordfrom the dictionary definition
it had just quoted." Id. at 27 (emphasis in original).
101. 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae at 2-3, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286)-
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Circuit used a succession of terms found in general purpose dictionary
definitions to find that dictionaries supported both a narrow and a broad
definition of the claim term.' 0 2 The court then used the specification of the
patent to determine that the claim encompassed only the narrow defini-
tion.103 Use of different dictionaries, such as medical dictionaries, however,
would not have allowed the court to reach the terms that led to the narrow
definition. 104 Thus, under the "dictionary first" approach, the court's choice
of dictionaries and the resulting definitions the court "chained together"
dictated the result of the court's claim construction.
In Novartis, the court had to determine the appropriate construction of
the term "hydrosol" and to decide whether the term "is limited to medicinal
products prepared outside of the body or whether it also includes products
formed within the stomach of a patient after a particular medicinal product
has been ingested."'105 The court found that the term included only the for-
mer and not the latter.] 06 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Texas
Digital and began its claim construction "with an examination of general
purpose dictionary definitions."' 107 These included the definitions of
"hydrosol," "sol," "solution," "medicinal," and "medicine" in Webster's
Third New International Dictionary; and the definition of "medicine" in the
Oxford English Dictionary. 08 The court also reviewed the definition of
"preparation" in medical dictionaries. 109 Although the disputed claim did
not include any of these terms, other than "hydrosol," 1 0 the court relied on
dictionary definitions for each term that came from the previous defini-
tion.Ill The court found that the dictionary definitions were broad enough
to cover both proposed meanings and looked to the intrinsic evidence, par-
ticularly the patent specification, to determine that the narrower definition
was consistent with the specification. " 2
102. Novartis, 363 F.3d at 1308-09.
103. Id. at 1310-11.
104. Id. at 1314 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1308.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1308-09 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1110 (Philip
Gove ed., 2002); 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 549 (2d ed. 1989)).
109. Id. at 1309 (citing MERRIAM WEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2003), available at
www.intelihealth.com; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (30th ed. 2003); STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000)).
110. Id. at 1307 (quoting claim I of the patent-in-suit).
11. Id. at 1308-09. For example, the definition of "hydrosol" was "a sol in which the liquid is
water," so the court then looked to the definition of"sol." Id.
112. Id. at 1309-11.
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Judge Clevenger, in dissent, rejected the majority's use of the diction-
ary definitions. 113 Judge Clevenger agreed with the majority's definition of
"hydrosol," but he disagreed with the way the majority defined the terms
that sprang from the "hydrosol" definition.11 4 Had the majority used medi-
cal dictionaries instead of general purpose dictionaries, the majority's defi-
nitions would not have included the term "solution," which led to the term
"preparation," which led to the narrower construction being an acceptable
"definition" of the term "hydrosol. '"115
Thus, in this case, the majority and the dissent argued over the proper
way to use dictionary definitions within the "dictionary first" approach.
The Novartis case shows that, if the court engages in a "dictionary scaven-
ger hunt," then it matters a great deal which dictionary the court chooses. In
Novartis, the court started with general purpose dictionaries, and not medi-
cal dictionaries. This choice allowed the court to develop a narrow defini-
tion as an acceptable definition, whereas a similar approach using only
medical dictionaries would not have allowed such a result because medical
dictionaries did not use the term "solution."" 16
This type of scavenger hunt is dangerous because the parties cannot
predict which on dictionaries the court will choose to rely. Although Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary seems to be a safe bet, the court
here referred to medical dictionaries for the definition of "preparation" but
not for the definition of "hydrosol" or "sol." Therefore, the dictionary first
approach promotes neither certainty nor predictability, the primary justifi-
cations for this approach in Texas Digital.
4. The dictionary first approach allows courts to ignore the context of the
disputed term.
The Federal Circuit should not adopt the "dictionary first" approach
because this approach does not appropriately take into account the context
of the term as used both in the claim and in the specification. A patent is
meant to stand on its own, needing only the knowledge of one skilled in the
art to be fully understood. 117 "[C]laim construction is 'a necessarily sophis-
113. Id. at 1313 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1313-14.
115. Id. at 1314.
116. The majority rejected this contention stating that it was not foreclosed from referring to the
definition of "solution" even if it did not appear in a prior definition. Id- at 1309 n.2- The majority,
however, did not refer to other definitions for words that did not appear in a prior definition.
117. Brief for the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the United States Department of
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission at 15, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978
(Fed. Cir. 1995), afftd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (A "patent is a fully integrated written instrument.")).
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ticated analysis of the whole [patent] document required by the standard
construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports
with the instrument as a whole."' 118
Patents require generalist judges to put themselves in the shoes of the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, which is not an easy task.
To do so, a court must look at how this hypothetical person would interpret
the claim term, and courts should keep in mind that "[p]ersons steeped in
the specialized language of a trade, or the business norms against which the
language was written, often eschew 'plain meaning' in favor of context,
while generalists use a more text-bound approach because that is easier and
less error-prone for outsiders." 119 Indeed, for any text, the reader is likely
to take the meaning of any term from context and only go to a dictionary to
determine the meaning of a term that the reader cannot divine from context
clues. 120
The "dictionary first" approach deprives the court of the opportunity
to divine the meaning of a claim term from context alone, in the way that
the intended audience of the patent would. 121 By requiring that the judge
determine the ordinary and customary meaning before even looking at the
written description or the prosecution history,122 the "dictionary first" ap-
proach may in fact deprive judges from determining the ordinary meaning
of a term, from the standpoint of one of ordinary skill in the art, because the
approach prohibits judges from fully appreciating the context of the claim
term as used in the integrated patent document.
118. Id. (quoting Marlonan, 517 U.S. at 389). Judge Linn also has recognized that context can
trump "definitions" if those definitions are in prescriptive working papers as opposed to objective
references that convey actual usage- ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co, 346 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (determining that working papers from the World Wide Web Consortium were "extrinsic" evi-
dence and could not be used to show the ordinary meaning of the claim term).
119. Cf Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 139, AFL-CIO v. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 393
F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement) (citing
Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw,
45 VAND. L. REv, 715 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Func-
tion of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231).
120. TIERSMA, supra note 89, at 116 ("I mostly look up a word because I heard or read someone
use it and do not know what she meant by it.").
121. Tiersma discusses sentence meaning as including "possible word meanings, as well as gram-
matical relationships between the words." Id. at 124. In the patent context, "sentence meaning" is more
relevant than "utterance" or "speaker's" meaning, which Tiersma describes as what the speaker meant
by the sentence. Id. Instead, in claim construction, the court is trying to determine what the reader, as
one of ordinary skill in the art, perceived the meaning of the term to be. Tiersma's discussion of
"speaker's meaning" is useful in the patent context, however, because he discusses taking background
information into account in determining the intended meaning. Id. at 125. In the patent context, the
court must review the meaning of the disputed term given the art area of the patent and the appropriate
level of skill in the art-all background information necessary to accurately determine the meaning of
the term.
122- Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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5. Left Behind? The dictionary first approach ignores the fact that dic-
tionaries cannot keep up with fast-changing technologies.
The dictionary first approach also is flawed because dictionaries lag
behind changes in language, particularly in fast-changing areas of technol-
ogy. Webster's Third New International Dictionary is the dictionary most
often used by the Federal Circuit, 123 but the latest printing of this dictionary
was published in 2002.124 Indeed, "[tlo be included in a Merriam-Webster
dictionary, a word must be used in a substantial number of citations that
come from a wide range of publications over a considerable period of
time." 125 This lag time creates a problem when people in a given art area
may be familiar with a usage of a term, but the Federal Circuit may errone-
ously rely on an out-of-date definition in a general purpose dictionary.
The term "cookie" provides a helpful illustration of this problem. Ac-
cording to the addenda of the 2002 edition of Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary, "cookie" means "a small file or part of a file stored on
the computer of a World Wide Web user, created and subsequently read by
a Web site server, and containing personalized user information (as a user
identification, customized preferences, or a record of pages visited)."126
The main body of the Webster's Third does not include any computer-
related definitions for "cookie."' 127 Nor does the 1993 Webster's Third or
its addenda include a computer-related definition of "cookie."' 128
However, many patents issued before 2002 included the word
"cookie" in the computer (and not baking) context. The first patent that
used the term "cookie" in a patent claim in the computer context was issued
in 1998,129 well before the 2002 printing of Webster's Third. This patent
included the following claims:
123. See supra Part III.A.2.
124. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Philip Gove ed., 2002). It is interest-
ing to note that, at least in Chicago, it is not terribly easy to find a copy of this printing of Webster's
Third. No copies are held in the Harold Washington branch (main branch) of the Chicago Public Li-
brary, the Seventh Circuit library, or the Chicago-Kent Law Library.
125. Merriam-Webster, How Does a Word Get into a Merriam-Webster Dictionary?, at
http://www.m-w.comlhelp/faq/wordsjin.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
126. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 75a (Philip Gove ed., 2002).
127. Id. at 500. It is interesting to note that the Federal Circuit has never cited to the addenda of
Webster's Third. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 75, at 39 n.153 ("We suspect that many who use
post-1961 printings of Webster's Third do not know about the existence of, much less the importance of
consulting, the Addenda Section. The Federal Circuit appears never to have cited it.").
128. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 69a, 500 (Philip Gove ed., 1993).
129. U.S. Patent No. 5,796,952 (issued Aug. 18, 1998). This patent was found using the search
feature on the USPTO's website, and searching for the term "cookie" in the "claims" field. Then, the
titles were manually sorted to find the earliest issued patent that used the term "cookie" in the intemet
context. See http://patfl.uspto.gov/netahtml/search-bool.html.
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17. A method of monitoring according to claim 1; wherein the step of
acquiring client identifying indicia from the client comprises the steps of
embedding a link to the second executable program in the file
downloaded from the first server, the second executable program being
executable on the third server, using the client to activate the link to the
second executable program by sending a request having a request header
containing client identifying indicia in an attempt to fetch the second ex-
ecutable program; using the third server to execute the second executable
program in response to activation of the link using the server to check
the request header issued by the client to determine if a client ID has
been set for the client, and, if no client ID has been set, setting an ID for
the client, and storing the client ID in a first database.
18. A method according to claim 17; wherein the client ID comprises a
cookie. 130
The written description of the patent helps to illuminate what the pat-
entee meant when the patentee used the term "cookie" in claim 18. The
"Background of the Invention" portion of the patent discusses a "custom-
izable home page" where the user submits preferences and "[t]he server
returns a Web page with a response header which creates, or 'sets' an ID
field located in a file on the client computer (this file is known as the 'client.
ID' or 'cookie') to include information about the user's preferences.", 131
This patent appears to be using the term "cookie" consistently with the
definition in the Webster's Third addenda. A court construing this term,
however, would not be able to look to the 2002 edition of Webster's Third
because it would not be contemporaneous with the patent document, 132
which was filed on March 21, 1997.133 Courts are not allowed to consult
references that are not contemporaneous with the patent because they "do
not reflect the meanings that would have been attributed to the words in
dispute by persons of ordinary skill in the art as of the grant of the...
patent."134
130. U.S. Patent No. 5,796,952, at col. 20,11.38-54 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at col. 1, 1.65 to col. 2,1. 16 (emphasis added).
132. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("[T]he court's task [in claim construction] of ascertaining the meaning of the claim terms [is conducted
from the view of] one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention.").
133. U.S. Patent No. 5,796,952.
134. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(refusing to consider noncontemporaneous references cited by the district court). It is appropriate that
courts only consult contemporaneous dictionaries (those in existence at the time the invention was
made), even though those dictionaries may be terribly out-of-date. The simple reason is that contempo-
raneous dictionaries are the ones available to competitors and people of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention. Even if later issued or later revised dictionaries better reflect the meaning of the
term at the time of the invention, they should not be acceptable evidence or at least should not be ac-
corded much weight. It would be unfair to competitors to allow the patentee to use evidence of meaning
that was not available at the time of the invention, Cf Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 124 S. Ct. 2276,
2294 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the lower court's use of a dictionary definition for
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Even though a court would almost certainly realize that "cookie" in
this patent should not be construed in the baking sense and would look to
other evidence, this example illustrates an important point: dictionaries lag
behind changes in technical language. Those skilled in the art were receiv-
ing patents that included the term "cookie" in claims in 1998 (and applying
for patents that included this term even earlier). Yet, the term did not ap-
pear in Webster's Third until the 2002 printing. Although this problem may
not result in an erroneous claim construction for the term "cookie" (because
the new usage is so different from the prior usage), this problem may have
an effect when definitions change over time, but less radically. If people
skilled in the art begin to use a term in a slightly different sense or in a
broader or narrower way, a dictionary may not adequately reflect this usage
until well after the shift has taken place. Therefore, although one skilled in
the art might read a term in a patent claim and believe that it had a certain
meaning, a court using the "dictionary first" method might construe the
term using an antiquated meaning because the court relied on an out-of-
date dictionary.
IV. No CERTAINTY OR NOTICE: THE HOLISTIC APPROACH
In its en banc decision, the Federal Circuit also should reject the holis-
tic approach. Although the holistic approach does provide the judge with
the most flexibility, it does little to promote the policies behind patent law.
While the "dictionary first" approach provides at least an illusion of
certainty, the holistic approach does not even supply this illusion. Because
under this approach the court is free to adopt a claim construction without
disclosing a methodology or even a clear rationale, the holistic approach
does not provide any advance notice to the parties of what the court is
likely to do. This uncertainty means that competitors cannot adequately
structure their conduct to avoid infringement. The holistic approach will
likewise not encourage innovation because patentees will be unaware of the
scope of their patents until the patents are tested in litigation. This uncer-
tainty means that patentees may be more likely to keep their inventions as
trade secrets, if possible, rather than disclosing the information to competi-
tors and later finding that their right to exclude is narrower than they
anticipated.
statutory interpretation because "[the lower court] relied on a dictionary that was unavailable when the
[statute] was enacted"). The dissent then looked to "[c]ontemporaneous dictionaries from the time of
the [statute's] enactment." Id. at 2295.
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Because the holistic approach promotes neither innovation nor cer-
tainty, the Federal Circuit should not adopt the holistic approach in its en
banc Phillips decision.
V. PRESERVING PUBLIC NOTICE: THE MODIFIED INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC
APPROACH
Although the Federal Circuit should not adopt the "dictionary first"
approach, the court should try to further one of the stated goals of the dic-
tionary first approach-preserving public notice-by adopting a methodol-
ogy that gives full effect to the public record of the patent but also
encourages patentees to remove ambiguity from the patent documents. To
do so, the Federal Circuit should adopt a modified intrinsic/extrinsic di-
chotomy which requires the following steps:
1) the court reviews the intrinsic evidence to determine if the
meaning of the claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence
only;
2) if the term is, ambiguous, the court reviews the parties' pro-
posed constructions to determine if the constructions are
equally plausible or if one party's construction is
unsubstantiated;
3) if one party's construction is unsubstantiated, the court con-
strues the term in favor of the substantiated meaning;
4) if the parties' proposed constructions are equally plausible, the
court construes the term against the patentee.
In claim construction, preserving public notice is especially important
because the public should be entitled to rely on the public record of the
patent. The public record includes the claims themselves, the specification,
and the prosecution history.135 The claims and specification are particularly
relevant because they make up the patent document, the document that a
competitor would first read when trying to determine if a patent covers the
competitor's device. The prosecution history also is relevant because it
includes representations that the patentee made to the United States Patent
& Trademark Office so that his patent would issue. If the examiner rejected
a claim based on interpretation A, the patentee proposed a different inter-
pretation B of the claim, and the examiner allowed the claim based on the
proposed interpretation B, the public should be entitled to rely on the pat-
entee's representation that the claim means B and not A.
135. The prosecution history, although not a part.of the patent document, is publicly available
through the United States Patent & Trademark Office.
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Given that the claims, specification, and prosecution history are pub-
licly available, the Federal Circuit should adopt a methodology that looks
to these sources first. This approach will ensure that, if a competitor re-
views the public record and attempts to design around the patent, the court
bases its claim construction primarily on the documents available to the
competitor.
A claim term, however, may not be clear from the public record of the
patent. In that instance, the court should analyze the competing interpreta-
tions of the parties to determine the plausibility of each interpretation. The
court must take this second step because, if the judge automatically con-
strued ambiguity against the patentee, then the patentee might never prevail
on claim construction, even if the accused infringer's interpretation was
tortured and the patentee's interpretation was significantly more likely to
represent the view of one skilled in the art. 136 The key to the second step is
two equally plausible interpretations. Presumably a party will always be
able to hire an expert who will testify to any interpretation that the party
wants to bring forward. Therefore, court must review the interpretations to
determine if the interpretations are equally plausible.
To determine if two interpretations are equally plausible, a court
should look to other evidence supporting an expert's testimony, such as
other patents, technical articles, technical treatises, and dictionaries. 137 If
the interpretations have equal support in contemporaneous literature, then
the two interpretations are equally plausible. If one side's interpretation has
copious support, while the other side puts forward only unsubstantiated
expert testimony, the two sides are not equally plausible, and the court
136. The determination of the appropriate claim construction is binding only on the parties before
the court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) ("[f]ssue preclusion could
not be asserted against new and independent infringement defendants even within a given jurisdic-
tion..."). Therefore, interested third parties, such as other competitors, who might not agree with the
current accused infringer's construction, would have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of claim
construction if they too are later accused of infringement. A detailed explanation of issue preclusion and
collateral estoppel as related to patent claim construction, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
137. The expert's testimony should not be that of the inventor of the patent-in-suit. In infringement
litigation, the inventor's own testimony is generally entitled to no or little weight. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc.
v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[Alfter-the-fact [inventor] testimony is of
little weight compared to the clear import of the patent disclosure itself."). The reason for according
little weight to inventor testimony is analogous to the parole evidence rule in contract law, where the
parties are often limited to the written contract as opposed to any oral agreements outside the written
document. See TIERSMA, supra note 89, at 37. In the patent context, the inventor is presumed to convey
his intent in the actual patent document, much like the parties to a fully integrated, written contract are
presumed to have conveyed their intent in the written contract. An inventor has the added advantage of
having much of his "negotiations" memorialized in writing in the prosecution history. Therefore, an
inventor's testimony about what he "meant" is entitled to little weight because he had ample opportu-
nity to memorialize his meaning in writing, as supplemented by the knowledge of one of ordinary skill
in the art.
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should favor the side that has put forward the substantiated testimony, re-
gardless of whether that side is the patentee or the accused infringer.
If the two interpretations are equally plausible, then the court should
construe the term against the patentee. Reasonable people could differ on
the proper interpretation of a term with two equally plausible meanings,
and the public would not have clear notice of what the term meant in the
patent. The patentee's competitors would read the patent, choose an inter-
pretation, and then attempt to avoid infringement of the patent. The com-
petitors, however, may choose the "incorrect" interpretation, according to
the patentee. If a term is unclear and there are two equally plausible inter-
pretations of the claim term, the patentee, and not the competitor, should
bear the risk associated with this ambiguity.
The patentee should bear the risk of ambiguity because the patentee is
in the best position to clarify any ambiguity when he is drafting the patent
document. The patentee has control over the terms he chooses and can
choose terms that are more or less precise. 138 The patentee also can choose
to act as his own lexicographer and define his own terms, and the patentee
can specify relevant prior art. 139 These options allow the patentee to solid-
ify the meaning of claim terms at the time the patent is drafted. If the pat-
entee chooses to leave ambiguity in the patent document, perhaps in the
hope of gaining a broader claim scope than the patentee can envision at the
time the patent is drafted, then the patentee should bear the risk that the
court will choose a narrower interpretation, perhaps even narrower than the
patentee foresaw when he drafted the patent.
On the other hand, competitors have only the public record of the pat-
ent and cannot ask the patentee what he intended when he drafted his pat-
ent. Competitors also do not have access to the patentee's experts until the
competitors have been accused of infringement. Therefore, competitors
who make reasonable interpretations of a claim term's meaning should not
138. Lawyers have a tendency to employ flexible terminology when they foresee a possibility that
the language could apply more broadly than if they use precise language. See TIERSMA, supra note 89,
at 78-79 ("When lawyers want to ... have a provision apply as broadly as possible, [passive voice and
nominalizations] can be very handy."). Additionally, "[l]awyers sometimes deliberately employ termi-
nology exactly because of its pliability." Id. at 79.
139. It is particularly relevant that this proposed approach encourages patentees to define any
"new" terms the patentee uses. These definitions are declaratory definitions. Id. at 117 ("[Dleclaratory
definitions may promote precision by making explicit which of the various possible meanings a word
has in a particular legal document."). In the cookie example in Part IIID., under the proposed approach,
the patentee would have added incentive to clearly define this term, because it is not well-documented
in dictionaries (and may not be well-documented in other references), even though people in the art area
know the meaning of the term. Indeed, because the meaning of the term may be evolving over time, the
patentee will have an incentive to give a preferred meaning so that people in the art area have a true
understanding of the meaning of the term as used in the patent.
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have to risk later finding themselves liable for infringement. Competitors
have no control over the patent application process, which is ex parte, and
competitors cannot object to ambiguous terms.
Because patents are obtained in an ex parte proceeding, the case for
construing ambiguity against the drafter is arguably even stronger in the
patent context than in other areas of law where courts construe documents
against the drafter, such as contract law. 140 In contract law, under the doc-
trine of contra proferentum, ambiguity is "construed against the drafter
who is solely responsible for [the contract's] terms." 141 Even under this
doctrine where one party was responsible for the terms of the contract, both
parties presumably had the opportunity to review the document, and the
nondrafter had the opportunity to object to the terms or refuse to accept the
contract altogether.' 142
Patents are not documents between private parties. Instead, patents are
a bargain between the patentee and the public in which the patentee dis-
closes his invention to the public in exchange for the exclusive right to
practice the invention for a limited time. 143 The patentee has an obligation
to fulfill his side of this bargain by providing public notice of what is cov-
ered by the patent claims. If the patentee does not fulfill this obligation,
then the court should construe the document against the patentee because
the patentee has received the benefit of the bargain (the exclusive right to
practice his invention) without fully complying with his obligation (provid-
ing adequate disclosure of his invention).
The competitor to a patentee, unlike the nondrafter of the contract, did
not have an opportunity to review the patent and object to provisions or
refuse his assent before the patent issued. Therefore, in the case of patent
claim construction, the court has stronger reasons to construe ambiguity
against the drafter of the patent than in contract interpretation under the
doctrine of contra preferentum.
140. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs.. Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
141. Id.; see also Tranzact Techs-, Ltd. v. Evergreen Partners, Ltd., 366 F.3d 542, 546 n.2 (7th Cir.
2004) (declining to apply the doctrine of contra proferentum where both parties were involved in the
drafting of the agreement).
142. In some instances, such as "click" agreements on the internet, the nondrafter does not have
even the opportunity to object. Such contracts are purely "take it or leave it." Even in such instances,
however, the nondrafter has the chance to leave it-that is, to choose not to click and thereby not accept
the terms of the agreement. For an interesting discussion of contracts of adhesion in the Federal Circuit,
see Christopher M. Kaiser, Take it or Leave it: Monsanto v. McFarling, Bowers v. Baystate Technolo-
gies, and the Federal Circuit's Formalistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
487 (2005).
143. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
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Miller & Hilsenteger ("Miller") have proposed an approach that would
require patentees to specify references such as dictionaries and treatises in
their patent applications.'4 4 This approach also may eliminate ambiguity
from the patent documents because competitors will have references to
review to determine the meaning of unclear terms, and judges, presumably,
would be required to rely on those references in claim construction analysis
in litigation. My proposed approach, however, allows the patentee to
choose when to incur the expense of defining terms and specifying refer-
ences in the patent application and when to defer the cost to litigation and
potentially incur the risk of leaving ambiguity in the patent document.
Under Miller's approach, the cost of applying for patents would
greatly increase because patentees would have to spend time and money
searching for references and verifying that all terms in the references are
defined in the way that the patentee intended. If the patentee cannot find a
good reference, the patentee could act as her own lexicographer and define
the term. While this is ultimately a desirable result because it would serve
the policy of public notice, this approach requires significantly more up-
front expense by patentees. Inventors, however, pursue patents for many
different reasons. An inventor may want a patent purely so he can say that
he is a "patented inventor." A company may want to collect lots of patents,
so it can tell its investors that it is an innovator in the field. The majority of
patents are never commercialized. 145 Therefore, Miller's approach requires
that a patentee pay significantly more for a patent even if the patentee never
intends to commercialize the patent and even though the patent will never
be the subject of litigation.
Under my proposed approach, the patentee can choose whether to de-
fine terms and specify references in the patent document. If the patentee
intends to commercialize the patent and knows either that the area of the
patent is highly competitive or is likely to become so, the patentee can
spend money upfront to ensure that the scope of the claims, including ref-
erences and definitions, is adequately defined. The patentee also can
choose to leave ambiguity in the document if the patentee does not believe
that the patent will ever become the subject of litigation.
The modified intrinsic/extrinsic approach provides a good balance be-
tween the policies of public notice and encouraging disclosure. Public no-
tice is served by encouraging patentees to remove ambiguity from the
144. Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 75, at 46.
145. Cf Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia ": A Means of Extinguishing the Fountain-
head?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 509, 518 (1999) ("ln reality, the majority of patents are not commer-
cialized.") (discussing whether patent rights confer monopoly power for antitrust purposes).
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patent document. The policy of encouraging disclosure is served because, if
patents are prohibitively expensive, then potential patentees may keep their
inventions as trade secrets rather than apply for patents. Society is served
by the patent disclosure because the disclosure puts technical information
into the public domain and can lead to secondary innovation. Miller's ap-
proach, however, promotes public notice but may discourage some people
from applying for patents altogether.
Some may argue that the modified intrinsic/extrinsic approach sup-
plants the "battle of the dictionaries" of the dictionary first approach with a
"battle of the experts plus other references" of the suggested approach.
First, the modified intrinsic/extrinsic approach will not devolve into a "bat-
tle of the experts plus" in cases where the meaning of a claim term is clear
from the intrinsic evidence. Second, where the meaning is not clear from
the intrinsic evidence, it is true that, under this approach, the parties will
present expert testimony along with additional references in prior art, trea-
tises, and other sources to support their proffered definition of the disputed
term. Where there is a dispute between parties, however, a case will de-
volve into a battle of something. In the proposed approach, this "some-
thing"-expert testimony plus references such as prior art patents-better
approximates the view of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made than solely using dictionaries to determine the mean-
ing of the disputed term. 146
In sum, the Federal Circuit should adopt a claim construction method-
ology in its en banc Phillips decision that best furthers the public notice
function of the claims. I describe this methodology as a modified intrin-
sic/extrinsic dichotomy, with a similar starting point to the methodology
used in Vitronics.147 The court should first look at the intrinsic evidence of
the patent because this evidence is the public record of the patent on which
the public is entitled to rely. If the term is clear from the intrinsic evidence,
then the court should not rely on extrinsic evidence to determine the mean-
146. Further, some may be concerned that this proposed approach will lead to judges importing
limitations from the specification into the claim. See Brief for Parus Holdings as Amicus Curiae at 8-9,
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286). Claim terms, how-
ever, should not be construed in a vacuum, and the specification provides valuable context to the claim,
including who one of ordinary skill in the art would be. Of course, judges must be aware of the concern
of importing limitations into the claim, but this result is a possibility regardless of the methodology
adopted. Instead of adopting a rigid methodology such as dictionary first to avoid this result, the Federal
Circuit should instead warn judges that they should give claim terms the full breadth of their appropri-
ate construction even though specific examples are given in the specification. The requirement that
judges not import limitations from the specification into the claim can be effectively argued by the
parties outside the specific claim construction methodology as a maxim of construction.
147. See supra Part II.A.
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ing of the term. The court could, however, review extrinsic evidence to
educate itself on how one skilled in the art would view the term.
If the court determined that the meaning of the term was ambiguous
from the intrinsic evidence, then the court would review the extrinsic evi-
dence to determine if the interpretations proposed by each side are equally
plausible. If one side's argument is plausible while the other side's is not,
then the court should choose the plausible, substantiated argument. If the
arguments are equally plausible, then the court should construe the term
against the patentee.
CONCLUSION
Depending on the term, the context, and the technology involved, dic-
tionaries may be highly relevant evidence that can help a court determine
what one of ordinary skill in the art thought the term meant. A bright-line
rule that looks to dictionaries as the primary evidence of the proper inter-
pretation, however, assumes too much. This rule assumes that dictionaries
will always-except in the rare instance of a clear disavowal-represent
the view of one skilled in the art, regardless of whether the term is general
or whether the term comes from a specialized field. It assumes that diction-
aries are contemporaneous with rapidly changing fields of technology.
Finally, it assumes that dictionaries are objective evidence. The dictionary
first approach ignores the possibility of differing outcomes depending on
the dictionary chosen and the choice of the appropriate definitions within
that dictionary. It ignores the fact that this rule can devolve into a "battle of
the dictionaries."
Instead, in its en banc Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit should
adopt an approach that comports with the public notice function of the pat-
ent claims. The modified intrinsic/extrinsic approach will allow competi-
tors to rely on the public record of the patent when choosing a course of
conduct. This approach also will construe ambiguous terms against the
patentee if there are two equally plausible constructions because the pat-
entee was in the best position to resolve any ambiguity at the time the pat-
ent was drafted. This approach will provide guidance to courts while at the
same time allowing courts the flexibility to educate themselves in the rele-
vant technical areas, so that judges can view the patent as would one of
skill in the art.
Therefore, while dictionaries may be relevant as background informa-
tion, courts should not use dictionaries as conclusive evidence of ordinary
meaning, particularly where the terms at issue have a specialized meaning
in the relevant field. In its en banc Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit
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should reject the "dictionary first" method and instead adopt the modified
intrinsic/extrinsic approach, a method for claim construction that better
approximates the view of one of ordinary skill in the art and furthers the
public notice function of patent claims.



